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0. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2006, the New York Times1 reported that a man in Afghanistan 
was facing a death sentence for the crime of apostasy, converting from Islam to 
Christianity. The United States Secretary of State reportedly called the President of 
Afghanistan to urge a “favorable resolution.” Meanwhile, the President of the 
Afghanistan Supreme Court expressed his intention to maintain his judicial 
independence and resist whatever interference with the resolution of the case.2  
For our juridical culture it is impossible to conceive that a person would face 
a death sentence for a personal view concerning religion. But how do you feel about 
a judge who claims his independence of judgment under the law in such a case? 
Judicial independence is generally viewed as an essential feature of liberal 
                                                 
1 Elliott, A. “In Kabul, a Test for Shariah”, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/26. 
2 Kritzer, H. “Law is the mere continuation of politics by different means: American judicial selection 
in the twenty-first century”, DePaul Law Review, (2007): 423. 
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democracy3; thus, don’t we want judges to exercise their independent judgment in 
interpreting and applying the law? The answer to this question is ambiguous. Yes, we 
want judges to exercise their independent judgment but so long as they are not too 
independent. Indeed, judges should be accountable to the public, especially to 
democratic institutions. Actually, as the role of courts has increased around the 
world, country after country has begun to face what Professor Alan Paterson 
succinctly described as a «conundrum of the apparently insoluble tension between 
judicial independence and judicial accountability».4 
Indeed, rarely these two principles find the right balance and it is evident in 
several contexts especially if you look models and procedures to select Constitutional 
and Supreme Court Judges. Indeed, often the way judges are recruited is not 
exclusively an administrative datum which affects only social and professional 
composition of the bench but it is an element which affects also the relationship that 
the judiciary establishes with other political actors, first of all, the people and the 
political institutions. As Herbert Kritzer said, with regard to the United States: «we 
are fundamentally conflicted about the role of law in politics and the role of politics 
in law, and that is evident in our ambivalence toward the way we choose and retain 
judges».5  
Usually when we refer to Supreme and Constitutional Courts, we speak about 
judicial review, rarely we study Courts’ structure and the way this structure could 
influence their functioning. Indeed, judicial selection procedures for constitutional 
judges contain norms which convey important values: values which are able to 
influence both Courts’ status and role in the constitutional order. The consequence is 
that Judicial selection process is not a neutral procedure: norms which refer to 
judicial selection, like all the positive norms of the system, convey a value. As J.H.H. 
                                                 
3
 Russell, P. “Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence” Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy. 
Eds. P. H. Russell and D. O’Brien. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001: 1. 
4
 Paterson, A. “The Scottish Judicial Appointment Board: New Wine in Old Bottles?” Appointing Judges in an 
Age of Judicial Power: critical perspectives from around the world. Eds. P. Russell and K. Malleson. Toronto, Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006.  
5 Kritzer, H. “Law is the mere continuation of politics by different means: American judicial selection 
in the twenty-first century”, cit., 423. 
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Wailer said: «it is evident that there is not a neutral standing between two options».6 
The method to select the judiciary is so rooted in a broader context which involves 
various individuals, groups and political institutions which can influence Judicial 
independence. Indeed, in economics, judicial recruitment would be defined as an 
“endogenous” variable, i.e. a variable which is a function of other variables. 
In this paper who wrote makes a comparative analysis of judicial selection 
procedures for Constitutional Courts in five well known countries: three (France, 
Italy and Germany) belonging to civil law tradition and two (United States and 
United Kingdom) belonging to common law tradition. Indeed, we are going to talk 
about a “sample group” of countries which are able to  make easier the analysis of 
the relationship between Judicial independence and accountability in Judicial 
selection.   
Indeed, the most part of the countries in the world select Constitutional 
Judges through political procedures: however none of them choose “direct” 
democracy model.7 Indeed, normally they choose intermediate models which 
substantially reflect one of these two principles: independence or accountability. The 
content of these two principle could appear obvious but it is not. Indeed, on the one 
hand, it is important to consider that when we refer to “Judicial independence” we 
comprehend both external and internal independence: in fact, as everybody knows, the 
first one regards to the independence of judges from the other constitutional powers; 
the second one, the independence of judges from the other judges. On the other 
hand, when we refer to “Judicial accountability” we must also consider that it is 
something different from judicial “responsibility”: the last one generally arises from 
the violation of norms (especially in meeting debts or payments). It is perfectly 
sharable and non always final. On the contrary, accountability can never be shared, 
indeed it affects in some way ethics and governance (for this reason it is often called 
“ultimate responsibility”). Finally, accountability is related to an “account-giving 
relationship” between individuals: in this context, a judge should be accountable not 
only to written norms, but also to people and society so to democratic institutions. 
                                                 
6 Weiler, J. H. H. Un’Europa cristiana,Un saggio esplorativo. Milano: Giuffré, 2003: 68. 
7 So, Judicial selection procedures where judges are directly elected by people. 
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These two principles, independence and accountability, usually have an 
instrumental nature: indeed, they are pursued because of their capacity to give 
legitimacy to Courts. However, it often happens that from pillars of courts’ 
legitimacy they became “absolute” principles. The risks are, with regard to judicial 
independence, to have Courts too much separate from political context and political 
institutions; with regard to accountability, instead, the relevant risk is to have Court 
too much politicized (so susceptible to be influenced by political parties). These 
situations often determine political crisis and institutional antagonisms. 
In this paper, we suggest to find out the instruments to face such institutional 
crisis, often caused by these absolutisms, in the rules of Constitutional Courts’ 
composition and selection. Indeed, we think that these rules could have a crucial role 
to increase Courts’ legitimacy, especially with regard to the other constitutional 
bodies. For these reasons, is necessary to analyze carefully these six elements: legal 
sources and transparency in judicial selection, number of Judges, professional requirements and 
Justices’ professional background, tenure in office, authorities involved in judicial nomination, 
Dissenting and Concurring opinion. 
In all the countries analyzed, the full consideration of these elements would 
give fundamental information to understand the relationships between constitutional 
justice and form of government.  
I. LEGAL SOURCES 
In each country we are going to consider in this paper, judicial selection 
procedures for Constitutional and Supreme Courts are entrusted in fundamental laws: 
that is Constitutions or Acts which have a constitutional rank. This choice seems to 
be full of significance and coherent with the particular status of these courts: the 
courts’ structure actually reflects the «hybrid role, somewhere between justice and 
politics»8 which all these courts play. In this field Robert Dahl9, one of the most 
                                                 
8 Meny, Y. Government and Politics in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990: 299. 
9 Robert Alan Dahl (born 17 December 1915), is the Sterling Professor emeritus of political science at 
Yale, where he earned his Ph.D. in political science in 1940. He is past president of the American 
Political Science Association and one of the most distinguished political scientists writing today. Dahl 
has often been described as “the Dean” of American political scientists. He earned this title by his 
prolific writing output and the fact that scores of prominent political scientists studied under him 
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popular American political scientist, stated that «to consider the Supreme Court strictly as a 
legal institution is to underestimate its significance in the American political system»10. Probably, 
according to the same reasons, the framer of European Constitutions opted for 
judicial selection procedures which respect both the balances between political 
powers (being a manifest example of institutional compromise) and which have a 
constitutional legitimacy. 
Consequently, in France, as we know, Constitutional Council composition is 
ruled under art. 56 of the French constitution.11 According to this norm it is 
composed of nine ordinary members and several of ex officio members that 
correspond to the former Presidents of the Republic.12 Only these last judges enjoy a 
life tenure13, whereas Constitutional Council's ordinary members are nominated for a 
term of nine years non renewable.  
In Italy, art. 135 of the Italian Constitution14 provides that the Corte 
costituzionale shall be composed of fifteen members and ascribes the nomination of 
                                                 
10 Dahl, R. “Decision-Making in a democracy: the Supreme Court as national policy- maker.” Emory L. 
J.  50 (2001): 582. 
11 Art. 56 of French Constitution."The Constitutional Council shall comprise nine members, each of whom shall hold 
office for a non-renewable term of nine years. One third of the membership of the Constitutional Council shall be renewed every 
three years. Three of its members shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, three by the President of the National 
Assembly and three by the President of the Senate.  
In addition to the nine members provided for above, former Presidents of the Republic shall be ex officio life members of 
the Constitutional Council.  
The President shall be appointed by the President of the Republic. He shall have a casting vote in the event of a tie." 
12 However, only former President Auriol and Coty used this opportunity, none of their successors 
have done so. 
13 However, only former President Auriol and Coty used this opportunity, none of their successors 
have done so. 
14 Art. 135.The Constitutional Court shall be composed of fifteen judges, a third nominated by the President of the Republic, 
a third by Parliament in joint sitting and a third by the ordinary and administrative supreme Courts. The judges of the 
Constitutional Courts shall be chosen from among judges, including those retired, of the ordinary and administrative higher 
Courts, university professors of law and lawyers with at least twenty years practice. 
Judges of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed for nine years, beginning in each case from the day of their 
swearing in, and they may not be re-appointed.  
At the expiry of their term, the constitutional judges shall leave office and the  exercise of the functions thereof. 
The Court shall elect from among its members, in accordance with the rules established by law, a President, who shall 
remain in office for three years and may be re-elected, respecting in all cases the expiry term for constitutional judges. 
The office of constitutional judge shall be incompatible with membership of Parliament, of a Regional Council, the practice of 
the legal profession, and with every appointment and office indicated by law.  
In impeachment procedures against the President of the Republic, in addition to the ordinary judges of the Court, there 
shall also be sixteen members chosen by lot from among a list of citizens having the qualification necessary for election to the 
Senate, which the Parliament prepares every nine years through election using the same procedures as those followed in 
appointing ordinary judges. 
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five members, respectively, to the Italian Parliament in joint sitting, to the President 
of the Republic and to the ordinary and administrative High Courts. 
In the US Constitution the Supreme Court selection process is governed by a 
sole legal rule.15 That rule is embedded under the Section 2, Art. II of the US 
Constitution which states that:  
«with the advice and consent of  the Senate, the President shall appoint […] 
judges of  the Supreme Court». The nine judges are in office «until good behavior»16, 
in few words, this means that Justices enjoy a life tenure in office except voluntary 
resignation or retire.  
Two cases which are different from the others are Germany and United 
Kingdom. The formal procedure concerning the composition and the functions of 
German Federal Constitutional Court (the Bundersverfassungsgericht hereafter BVerfGG) 
are settled in the Fundamental (or Basic) law (hereafter FL) both under art. 93 and 
100 (functions), 94 (compositions) and under sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the 
Constitutional Court Law, consequently, also under ordinary laws. The Fundamental 
law only says that «half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court shall be elected by the 
Bundestag and half by the Bundestrat». We can see as Court's members number is not 
established by the FL but it is ruled by an ordinary law which disciplines also all the 
details of Bundestag and Bundestrat nominations. 
Also in United Kingdom Judicial selections procedures are now ruled in 
details: indeed the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (hereafter CRA), pursuing the 
goal of judicial independence, tries to figure out a system which is characterized for 
extreme transparency. Consequently part III of the CRA disciplines the Judicial 
appointment procedure with extreme specification. 
This short overview shows that formal appointments mechanisms are always 
known and ruled by constitutional norms. The reasons of this choice seem to be two: 
on the one hand, the Constitution emphasizes the particular status of these courts, on 
the other hand, there is the aim to legitimize throughout the Constitution important 
institutional compromises.  
                                                 
15 Goldberg, D. and Kozlowsky, M. “The Politics of Choosing United States Supreme Court Justices” 
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law (2009): 6. 
16 Art. III Sect. 8, § 1, American Constitution 
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However, while formal appointments mechanisms are always known, the 
reality of the process by which judges are chosen is not. Usually it is ruled by 
informal customs which are not well known and easy to be detected. Anyway, the 
degree of this lack of transparency is changeable: it is minimum in Germany and 
United Kingdom where, as we have pointed out, a certain degree of specification is 
achieved by ordinary laws or by the same Constitutional Statute;  it is higher in the 
United States where the “not written” procedures have a fundamental role. However 
it has to be considered that the informal American procedures are completely 
balanced by the high degree of advertising and general involvement of both 
institutional and not institutional bodies (think about the public hearings of the 
Senate, the involvement of the American Bar Association and interest groups). These 
elements are totally absent in France and Italy where the small formal regulation is 
not balanced by a sufficient degree of transparency and public involvement . 
II. NUMBER OF JUDGES 
Significant elements arise from the analysis of Judges’ number. Indeed, 
whether Italy and Germany opt for big courts, respectively, composed by 15 and 16 
Judges, on the contrary, France and Unites States opt for smaller courts of nine 
judges for each. In the middle there is the UK Supreme Court which, according to 
art. 23 of the CRA, is composed by 12 judges. 
Being in force the majority principle, is evident as the choice of big or small 
courts has an important influence on courts functioning. Normally a bigger court is 
created to guarantee a greater judiciousness of courts decisions. This quality is 
requested for courts which are conceived as guardians of the equilibrium in the 
constitutional system (and it is the case of Italy and Germany where the 
constitutional courts are officially entrusted of this guaranty role). 
On the other side, the danger of smaller courts is that they can take decisions 
which are partial and not shared into the court. The political and ideological 
positions can be easily stigmatized in a smaller court. In this regard, is useful to refer 
to the US Supreme Court where ideological alignments are manifest.  
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III. PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND 
Another important indicator of the values which are rooted in judicial 
selection procedures for Constitutional Courts is the request of high professional 
standards. Indeed, it is evident that when there is an high specification of 
professional requirements there will be a lower degree of “discretion” in judicial 
nominations (so a higher degree of judicial independence). Indeed, the authority (often 
a political one) entrusted to judicial nominations power will select the candidate not 
according to subjective or ideological criteria, but according to objective, strictly 
established criteria (free of any political evaluation) often based on merit. In addition 
to this, a constitutional court mainly composed by professionals will pursue a modus 
operandi which is typical of a juridical culture. 
The situation appears in these terms in Italy, Germany and, after the CRA, 
also in the United Kingdom. Indeed, in both of these countries are established 
precise professional requirements in order to be elected as a Judge to constitutional 
courts. Art. 135 phar. 2 of Italian Constitution states that:  «the judges of the 
Constitutional Courts shall be chosen from among judges, including those retired, of 
the ordinary and administrative higher Courts, university professors of law and 
lawyers with at least twenty years of practice». Therefore, in the Italian constitutional 
court are represented three professional categories: the academics, the jurisdictional 
order and the lawyers. However they are provided two common criteria: an old 
service and a law degree.  
The German Fundamental law states that both Bundestrat and Bundestag will 
elect, at least, three professional judges who must have worked for three years as 
judges of a Federal High Court (so, in total, professional judges have to be six over 
sixteen). The remaining judges are lay judges, however, the law provides that lay 
judges must be qualified to judicial career (in practice this consists in passing the 
second public examination with high scores, an examination which has to be 
overcome to perform all the legal professions) in this way enforcing the judicial 
nature of the Court.  
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Finally, the CRA establishes several requirements in order to be appointed to 
the UK Supreme Court: for example, the candidate has to have held high judicial 
offices for a period of at least 2 years, or have been a qualifying practitioner for a 
period of at least 15 years (art. 25). 
Coherently with the rules and principles stated before, the following data 
show important evidences: indeed, looking to tables number 1, 2 and 5 we can notice 
how the most part of Italian, German and British judges have been ordinary or 
administrative judges: so not involved in politics. The circumstances are totally 
different in France where (see table number 4) the most part of Court’s members 
have a professional experience as public officials and, moreover, where six out of 
nine judges have had a political past in the executive or in the legislative branch. 
Surely, the lack of specific qualifications in order to be appointed as a judge (not even 
a law degree) 17 has relevant influence on Court composition; surely, this datum 
contributes to consider the Conseil Constitutionnel as a sort of appendix of the political 
power.  
These last considerations are not valid with regard to the United States: here, 
as well as in France, there is no constitutional norm which establishes a minimum 
standard  to be appointed as a Supreme Court Judge. However, it is evident that, in 
practice, several criteria are taken into consideration. For example, in the last decade 
of the twentieth century the form of political appointment which became 
increasingly important is the “criterion driven appointment.”18 The White House and 
the Department of Justice developed criteria that they would use when the possibility 
of a nomination materialized. These criteria included the demographic identity of the 
candidate, but also the age, the gender and judicial philosophy or ideology (criteria 
which, often, are not easily identifiable). All these versions of politics still have an 
important role. In 2008, for example, there was a common agreement that the next 
nomination should go to a person of Hispanic origin and, if possible, a woman 
(Judge O' Connor, the only woman in the court, in fact would be departed for the 
                                                 
17 Since the D'Estaign presidency, the trend has been to appoint candidates with legal experience, 
although Mitterrant relied on the tradition standard of personal loyalty. In Stone, A. The Birth of Judicial 
politics in France, the constitutional Council in comparative prospective, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1992. 
18 Yalof, D. A. Pursuit of Justice: Presidential Politics and the selection of Supreme Court nominees. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999: 240 ff.. 
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court soon). This led to the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor. Indeed, in the US 
will be found judges who correspond not only to high “professional” standards but, 
also, to high “representative” standards. In the United States, being the awareness of 
Supreme Court’s political power, the principal scope is not an independent Court but 
a Court which is able to represent the several “spirits” of American people. Table 
number 5 confirms the analysis: all Judges have an important academic past or an 
experience as judges. All judges can be considered an evident representation of 
religious, ethnic, sexual expectation of the country. 
In conclusion, we can state that judicial selection procedures, providing or 
not professional requirements, have an important influence on the real composition 
of the Constitutional or Supreme Court, including the academic or professional 
qualification of judges. The following table makes an overview of these evidences: 
 
- In France, where professional requirements ARE NOT established: 
 5/9 judges studied political sciences and came from the ENA: equal to 55,5% 
 5/9 judges before nomination exercised administrative or political offices: 55,5% 
 8/9 have a political or administrative past: 88,9% 
 
- In Italy, where very strict requirements ARE established: 
 15/15 judges have a law degree: 100% 
 7/15 judges have been professors, 6/15 judges, only 2/15 are lawyers 
 10/15 judges have a political or administrative past: 66,7%(2/3) 
 
- In Germany, where requirements exist: 
 13/16 judges have a PhD in Law: 81,3%10/16 have been professors ( 62,5%),  
 6/16 are judges 
 8/16 judges have a political or administrative past: 50% 
 
- In the United States, where there ARE NOT written requirements: 
 5/9 judges have a law degree at Harvard (2 Yale, 1 Columbia): 55,6% 
 5/9 have been professors,  
 4/9 judges.4/9 exercised a political office: 44,4% 
 
- In the United Kingdom, where there ARE written requirements: 
 8/12 judges come from Cambridge or Oxford University; 66% 
 12/12 have a judicial experience; 100%  
 4/12 have had a political or an administrative past 33,3% 
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IV. TENURE IN OFFICE. 
One of the instruments conceived to grant Constitutional Courts’ 
independence is the term of judges’ tenure in office: indeed, normally Constitutions 
provide long and no renewable terms. The goal is to prevent a strong degree of 
political homogeneity with the representative bodies. In fact, in this case there is the 
risk to pass from a control to an “self control”.19 
In France Constitutional Council's ordinary members are nominated for a 
term of nine years not renewable (except ex officio members, that is the former 
Presidents of the Republic, who enjoy a life tenure).20 The same nine years term is in 
Italy where don’t exist members with a life tenure. In Germany, until 1970, it was 
provided a life tenure for professional judges and, on the contrary, a tenure of eight 
years for lay judges. Then Constitutional judges are in office for twelve years and 
they are not renewable. In conclusion, we can observe that Continental European 
courts generally opt for medium or long terms (always not renewable).  
On the contrary, in UK and US we find “life” appointment. Art. 33 of the 
CRA states that «a judge of the Supreme Court holds that office during good behavior, 
but may be removed from it on the address of both Houses of Parliament». 
However, like all British judges, Supreme Court justices are forced to retire at age 70 
if first appointed to a judicial office after 31 March 1995, or at age 75 otherwise.21 
In the same way, the US Supreme Court, since its creation in 1789, has been 
composed by “life tenure” judges. This means that a member of the Court leaves the 
Court only in case of resignation, retire, or death. This extreme choice is 
proportionate with the high degree of politicization of judicial nomination for US 
Supreme Court. Recently we saw the retirement of the oldest and arguably most 
liberal justice of the Court: the ninety years old Paul Stevens. This man even if he was 
appointed by the republican president Gerald Ford in 1975, became a hero of liberal 
                                                 
19 De Siervo, U. La Corte costituzionale nel nostro sistema costituzionale, Pavia 29 march 2011. Web.  9 April 
2011 <http://giurisprudenza.unipv.it/docsDidattica/rigano/DeSiervo_Pavia_20010329.pdf>.   
20  However, only former President Auriol and Coty used this opportunity, none of their successors 
have done so. 
21 See Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 
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vote. Stevens will be known as the dissenter in the case Bush v. Gore22, the decision 
which decreed the victory of George W. Bush at the Presidential elections.  Stevens 
commented the US Supreme Court decision with these words:  
«although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner 
of this year's presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear: It is 
the nation's confidence in the judge as the impartial guardian of the rule of 
law.»23  
Notwithstanding his past, Stevens decided to leave the court just during 
Obama presidency. As we know, Obama replaced Stevens with Elena Kagan a 
candidate who was not greeted with particular enthusiasm. Indeed, during the public 
hearings in the Senate, republicans opposed her nomination saying that «it is difficult to 
see how her experience fundraising for Harvard Law School qualifies her for a seat on the Nation’s 
high court» and underlying how much the candidate is “disturbingly out of the 
mainstream”.24  
Nevertheless, Elena Kagan (the first woman Dean of Harvard Law School) 
took a judicial office for the first time in her life only in January 5, 2009 (once 
nominated Solicitor General  by the same Obama). 
In conclusion, with this overview we noticed that both the “long terms” and 
the “life tenure” have the same goal: to favor judicial independence. However to 
understand the different rationales which justify such choices, we must verify how 
these tenure terms articulate with appointment provisions. Indeed this deals with the 
“core” business of our analysis: the relationship (so the equilibrium) between 
Political institutions and Constitutional courts in the context of judicial nominations.  
V. AUTHORITIES CHARGED WITH JUDICIAL SELECTION. 
As we said before, none of the considered countries chooses direct 
democracy models to select Constitutional judges: normally, judges are elected or 
                                                 
22 121 S. Ct. 525. 
23
 http://abcnews.go.com/ Politics/Supreme_Court/ justice –john –paul –stevens -retires-us-
supreme-court/story?id=9615609 (last visited March 2011). 
24
 http://www.redstate.com/jrichardson/ 2010/04/04/ stevens –retirement -makes-way-for-
second-obama-scotus-pick/ (last visited march 2011) 
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appointed by several authorities. These authorities could be political or not political 
and they could decide separately or in cooperation with other authorities. An 
important premise to analyze the datum is understand that political authorities which 
decide separately are a sign of politicization. On the contrary, the absence of political 
authorities and cooperation are a sign of independence. Developing this scheme we 
can observe as in France judges are appointed by the most relevant individual 
authorities of the State: indeed, three of the nine judges are appointed by the 
President of the Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly and three 
by the President of the Senate. The authorities entitled of the appointing power 
decide without any cooperation and, moreover, have complete discretion as to whom 
they appoint: indeed, as we said before, no specific qualifications are required for 
appointments, not even a law degree.25 The constitutional reform of 2008 tried to 
temper this asset providing a form of political assembly involvement. Indeed, new 
art. 56 stated that «les nominations effectuées par le président de chaque assemblée sont soumises 
au seul avis de la commission permanente compétente de l'assemblée concernée». Consequently, the 
nominees are valued by a permanent commission. Although this is an important 
reform which enhances parliament prerogatives in judicial selection, it has to be 
considered that the contribute of the parliament is only an “avis”, so a simple advice 
which is never binding. Moreover, the France Constitution saying that “it is sole the 
permanent commission which is able to value the nominations” underlines that the 
scope is always to safeguard political authorities’ discretion, reducing transparency 
and public involvement in judicial procedures. This systems seems to be the less 
representative of both judicial independence and transparency. Nevertheless all these 
considerations are perfectly coherent with the difficulties which the Constitutional 
Council met to achieve its legitimacy. Even if France is the homeland of 
Montesquieu, the author of the separation of powers’ principle, in this country the 
power has been concentrated in a sole body: the Parliament. The strict application of 
the principles of the popular sovereignty and of the supremacy of the legislative 
power did not leave any space to accept any juridical, so external control over the 
                                                 
25 Since the D'Estaign presidency, the trend has been to appoint candidates with legal experience, 
although Mitterrant relied on the traditional standard of personal loyalty. In Stone, A. The Birth of Judicial 
politics in France, the constitutional Council in comparative prospective, cit. 
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legislation. Indeed, as we know, when the Constitutional Council was created it 
exercised only an “abstract review” (or a priori review). It was the constitutional 
reform of 1974, (which expanded the right of referral to a parliament minorities: sixty 
deputies and senators) and the recognition as binding of the Déclaration des Droits de 
l'Homme et du Citoyen in 1997, which contributed to increase Counsel’s influence. 
Finally, the constitutional reform of July 2008 (known as “Réforme Balladur”) provides 
a sort of a posteriori review and the possibility for individuals to raise a defense of 
unconstitutionality before an ordinary court (even if the real innovation of this 
reform is still doubted) 26.  
In the US, Supreme Court Justices are selected by a procedure which sees the 
cooperation between two fundamental institutions. The formal procedure to select 
Supreme Court judges is simple: when a vacancy occurs (because a member of the 
Court resigns, retires, or dies), the President makes a nomination with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Although it is not expressly stated in the Constitution, the 
Senate's prerogative of “advise and consent” has been interpreted as the power to 
confirm judicial nominees with a simple majority vote. 
However, the actual process of selection is complicated by several factors 
such as the role of unofficial participants, both individuals and groups, with a deep 
interest in nomination and confirmation decisions. Apart from the members of the 
president administration, the most important of these informal participants can be 
reconnected to three categories: legal community, other interest groups and potential 
justices. The largest and the more powerful legal community is the American Bar 
Association (hereafter ABA). Indeed, an ABA committee investigates over 
presidential nominees who wait confirmation and evaluates them as “well qualified,” 
“qualified,” or “not qualified.” The experience confirms that an unanimous rating of 
“well qualified” helps to smooth the path to Senate approval. Indeed, treating judicial 
selection of Supreme Court judges, we should not underestimate the role of the 
Senate: James Madison, in forming and supporting the role of the Senate, noted that 
the «Executive and the Senate, in the cases of appointments to office and of treaty, 
                                                 
26
 Fabbrini, F. “La loi organique sul controllo di costituzionalità in via incidentale e lo scrutinio 
preventivo del Consil Constitutionnel.” Quaderni Costituzionali 1 (2010): 124.  
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must be considered as independent of and coordinate with each other».27 According 
to him, the  President and the Senate shared a power as a function of Art. II. Several 
subsequent Presidents gave their opinions on the appointment power of Art. II and, 
generally, they argued for the exclusive power of the presidency. A part from these 
juridical disputes, the role of the Senate has an indubitable importance: the Senate's 
power to confirm or reject presidential nominees to the Court has resulted in the 
rejection of 28 of 148 nominations in the Court's history,28 which means that the 
18% (one out of five) of presidential nominations have been rejected. Concretely, the 
presidential nomination is directly referred to a Judiciary Committee of the Senate, 
which gathers extensive information on the nominee but, especially, holds the public 
hearings of the candidates. The main purpose of these interviews is to obtain public 
testimony or comment on the “future” judge, including personal and sensible pieces 
of information such as religion, ideology and even political views. Subsequently, the 
Committee votes its recommendation for Senate action. After this vote the 
nomination is referred to the floor, when, after a debate, is taken a confirmation vote 
which requires a simple majority (although a large minority of senators could block 
confirmation through a filibuster that uses extended debate to prevent a 
confirmation vote). Several factors affect Senate's action: one is the president's 
political strength in the Senate: in this case senators of the majority party, which is 
the president's party, chair the Judicial committee and schedule votes on the floor. 
Another factor is president's strength. Usually, presidents who enjoy a large public 
approval have an advantage: strong public support deters opposition to their 
nominees.29 Finally, the Senate's appointment power is extremely important during 
the period of “divided government”, that is when the executive and the legislative 
powers belong to different parties. Indeed, presidents have had an 87.9% success rate 
with respect to Senate confirmations of Supreme Court nominees at times when the 
                                                 
27 Madison, J. “To the Senate of the United States, July 6, 1813.” A Compilation of the Messages and Papers 
of the Presidents, 1789-1897. Ed. J. D. Richardson. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897, 
1: 531. 
28 Savage, D. The Supreme Court and the powers of the American government. 2nd ed. Washington DC: CQ Press, 
2009: 551.  
29 Baum, L. The Supreme Court. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2007: 44.  
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White House and the Senate are controlled by the same political party. During times 
of divided government, this figure drops to 54.5%30 ! 
In conclusion, the political nature of the judicial selection for US Supreme 
Court is evident as well as its political role. However, unlike judicial recruitment of 
the majority of European Constitutional Courts’ judges the selection seems to be 
affected by a relevant degree of transparency, which explains also the large amount 
of research concerning this subject. Moreover, transparency of judicial appointment 
procedures, also achieved by the involvement of interest groups, media and political 
and non political actors, contributes to legitimize, in part, the political nature and role 
of this court.  
In Germany judicial selection procedure is still different: indeed the 16 judges 
are not selected by individual authorities but elected with a majority of the two-third of 
the votes. One-half of them are nominated by the Federal Parliament, the Bundestag, 
and the other half by the Bundestrat the Federal Council.31 More specifically, the 
Bundestag elects its eight judges indirectly through a twelve-person Judicial Selection 
Committee (hereafter JSC). According only to these formal information in Germany 
the sixteen judges of the BVerfGG are elected by a more democratic procedure which, 
indeed, involves both the houses of the Parliament. Indeed, the Constitutional Court 
composition reflects both the sources of legitimization of federal power: the people 
(through the Bundestag) and the Länder (through the Bundestrat). 
The smallest degree of politicization, at least according to a formal point of 
view, concerns the Italian Constitutional Court. Judicial selection procedure seems to 
be more balanced because of two criteria: the first one is that in two cases out of 
three we have collegiate nominations, the second one is that there is the participation 
of all the powers of the State. As we now, under art. 135 of the Italian Constitution,32 
                                                 
30 Goldberg, D. and Kozlowsky, M. “The Politics of Choosing United States Supreme Court Justices” 
cit., 6. 
31 The Bundestag is an organ of the legislature, while the Bundestrat is an organ through which the 
Länder assist in the passing of federal law and in the administration of the Bund. In Fisher, H. D. The 
German Legal System and Legal Language. New York: Routledge and Cavendish, 2009. 
32 Art. 135. The Constitutional Court shall be composed of fifteen judges, a third nominated by the President of the 
Republic, a third by Parliament in joint sitting and a third by the ordinary and administrative supreme Courts. The 
judges of the Constitutional Courts shall be chosen from among judges, including those retired, of the ordinary and 
administrative higher Courts, university professors of law and lawyers with at least twenty years practice. 
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the Corte costituzionale shall be composed of fifteen members. The Constitution 
ascribes the nomination of five members, respectively, to the Italian Parliament in 
joint sitting, to the President of the Republic and, above all, to the ordinary and 
administrative High Courts.  This norm is the result of a compromise which takes 
into account both juridical reasons and political ones. The Constitutional Court 
composition recalls the division of powers33 of Montesquieu: indeed this is the sole 
case where a (conspicuous) part of the Court is selected by the Judiciary 34. However, 
politics remains inside judicial selection: indeed, according to a conventional rule, the 
parliamentary nominations are allocated among the parties, using the same 
distribution as Parliament according to a sort of lottizzazione35. In spite of this 
phenomenon in the Italian contest the independence of the Court is a consolidate 
opinion: its decisions are considered «unsigned and without dissents, making partisanship 
difficult to measure»36. 
However we should consider that in 2004 the Parliament discussed a reform 
project, the n. 486237 which provided, under art. 40, a change of Court’s ordinary 
composition: on the one hand it was proposed to reduce both judges nominated by 
the President of the Republic and by the highest ordinary and administrative Courts 
                                                                                                                                     
Judges of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed for nine years, beginning in each case from the day of their 
swearing in, and they may not be re-appointed.  
At the expiry of their term, the constitutional judges shall leave office and the  exercise of the functions thereof. 
The Court shall elect from among its members, in accordance with the rules established by law, a President, who shall 
remain in office for three years and may be re-elected, respecting in all cases the expiry term for constitutional judges. 
The office of constitutional judge shall be incompatible with membership of Parliament, of a Regional Council, the practice of 
the legal profession, and with every appointment and office indicated by law.  
In impeachment procedures against the President of the Republic, in addition to the ordinary judges of the Court, there 
shall also be sixteen members chosen by lot from among a list of citizens having the qualification necessary for election to the 
Senate, which the Parliament prepares every nine years through election using the same procedures as those followed in 
appointing ordinary judges. 
33
 Celotto, A. “Rappresentanza e Corte costituzionale.” Rappresentanza politica, gruppi di pressione, élites al 
potere, Atti del Convegno di Caserta, 6-7 maggio 2005. Ed. L. Chieffi. Torino: Giappichelli, 2006: 179 ss.  
34 So, by non-political authorities.  
35 The “lottizzazione” is an Italian political custom according to which there should be the same 
political parties equilibrium both in the Parliament and in the Constitutional court. Concretely, this 
means that when a judge leaves his office, and the political equilibrium in the Parliament is unchanged 
(so, the same political party has the majority), the following judge has to be proposed by the same 
political party which made the previous judicial nomination.  
36 Volcansek, M. “Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy.” Comparative political studies 26 (1994): 492. 
37 Atti Parlamentari, XIV Legislatura, Camera dei deputati, A proposal of Constitutional reform to the Part II 
of the Italian Constitution, (Disegno di legge costituzionale recante “Modifiche di articoli della Parte II della 
Costituzione)” signed by Berlusconi, Fini and others, consigned to the presidency in march, 30th 2004, 
printed N. 2544. 
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(from five to four) and, on the other hand, to increase the parliamentary nominations 
(from five to seven). These last nominations shall be entrusted to a Federal Senate 
integrated with the Presidents of the Regions and of the autonomous Provinces. This 
proposal has been criticized because of two reasons: firstly, this reform reduces the 
number of judges who are not elected according to political criteria; secondly, assigning 
to the Federal Senate (and not to the Parliament in joint sitting) the nomination of the 
majority of Constitutional judges, the reform project reveals the idea to introduce a 
sort of “federalist factor” to the Constitutional Court radically changing the nature of 
this body (which is supposed to be impartial). According to this position the new 
composition of the Court could totally change the nature of this organ especially 
relating to its arbiter role during the conflicts between State and Regions.38 
Finally, we must pay particular attention to UK Supreme Court selection 
procedures. Indeed, although it is a Court which acts in a common law tradition 
country, the primary rationale for its creation was to remove the United Kingdom's 
top court from Parliament so as to ensure a clearer formal separation of powers 
between the legislature and the judiciary. Consequently, the appointment process for 
the Supreme Court is strongly focused on avoiding the usual political commitment. 
Under article 27 of the CRA candidates are selected by a Supreme Court Judicial 
Appointments Commission made up of the President of the Court, the Deputy 
President and one representative of each of the regional judicial appointment bodies 
(England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). Only one of these three 
members needs be a layperson. This ad hoc commission selects one name to go to the 
Lord Chancellor who has limited powers to reject that name or ask the Commission to 
reconsider their decision. The role of the Prime Minister is now reduced to that of a 
conduit, passing the name provided by the Lord Chancellor to the Queen for 
appointment.39 Art. 27 of the Reform Act highlights that the selection "must be on 
merit," and that «in making selections for the appointment of judges of the Court the 
commission must ensure that between them the judges will have knowledge of, and 
experience of practice in, the law of each part of the United Kingdom». 
                                                 
38 Caretti, P.  De Siervo,  U. Istituzioni di diritto pubblico Torino: Giappichelli Editore, 2004: 381. 
39 Malleson, K. “The evolving role of the Supreme Court” Public Law (2011): 43. 
Antonina Peri  
Judicial independence vs. judicial accountability Judicial selection models for…   19 
VI. DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION 
The last aspect which contributes to accomplish, with several interesting 
stimuli, the overview of justice and politics relationships is the possibility to publish 
dissenting and concurring opinions. This datum, apparently untied with precedent 
analysis could be important to detect the implications between judicial selection 
procedures on justice and politics relationship. As we know, continental European 
courts, with the exception of  Germany, adopt collegiate judgments as a means to, 
concretely, favor judicial independence; on the contrary, common law courts 
pacifically adopt dissenting and concurring opinions. This element stresses the 
individuality of  each judge, giving the possibility to stigmatize judge’s attitudes and 
allows it to verify judges’ s political loyalty. In the US, the transparency of  judges’ 
decisions and opinions allows to detect liberal or conservative ideological lines which 
are, often, in contrast between them. In this context it is relevant to cite the US case: 
indeed, the last US Supreme Court term, which ended in June, was the stormiest in 
recent memory, with more 5-to-4 decisions split along ideological lines than at any 
time in the court’s history. According to the rumors among Supreme Court law 
clerks, the level of  tension among the Justices is higher than at any point since Bush v. 
Gore in 2000. Not long after beginning his tenure as Chief  Justice in 2005, John G. 
Robert Jr. announced publicly that he would try to promote unanimity and 
collegiality on the court. During his first months on the job, the court managed to 
achieve his goal, issuing a series of  9-to-0 opinions. But the brief  period of  harmony 
abruptly ended: the percentage of  5-to-4 decisions in which the four liberals were 
together in dissent rose to 80 percent, up from 55 percent in the 2004 term. For the 
foreseeable future, the Court seems likely to be polarized, with the conservative bloc 
ascendant and the liberal bloc embattled. Justice Stevens, the oldest and arguably 
most liberal justice, now finds himself  the leader of  the opposition.40 
However the US example is not representative of all possible consequences: 
the possibility of dissenting and concurring opinions is not always cause of division 
and fragmentation. In Germany, for example, where dissenting opinions are 
                                                 
40 Rosen, J. “The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens.” 23 Sept. 2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/>.   
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accepted, recently only the 9% of the decisions have been adopted with a majority 
vote. Indeed, decisions have been often taken with the unanimity. It is relevant that 
the prestige of the Court was increased by this conduct: a conduct totally transparent 
which gave legitimacy to the court. On the other hand, in Italy and in France the 
absence of dissenting opinions contributes to create ambiguous courts: difficult to 
understand and classify in the political schema 41. In the present the absence of 
dissenting opinions could worsen the relationships between institutions, making 
more difficult the direct relationship with the people. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis pointed out as judicial selection procedures for Constitutional 
and Supreme Courts are strongly related to the rules governing the “institutional 
equilibrium”. A good knowledge of Courts’ structure could give important 
information about their functioning. According to this point, we made an overview 
of six “structural” elements (legal sources, number of Judges, professional 
requirements, authorities charged with nominations, dissenting and concurring 
opinions) which reveals the importance that each country gives to judicial 
independence or, vice versa, to judicial accountability. 
The analysis of the first of these data showed that Judicial selection 
procedures for Constitutional and Supreme Courts are mostly entrusted in 
fundamental laws. The reasons of  this choice seem to be two: on one hand the 
constitution emphasizes the particular status of  these courts, on the other hand there 
is the aim to legitimize throughout the constitution some important institutional 
compromises. Hardly ever, except the US case, this constitutional regulation is 
associated to an appropriate degree of  transparency of  informal praxis which drives 
to nominations. This determines a greater degree of  discretion of  political 
authorities in judicial nomination, so a greater influence of  politics in Constitutional 
Court composition.  
The second structural datum, which is related to the number of judges, points 
out that whether Italy and Germany (and also the United Kingdom) opt for big 
                                                 
41
 Celotto, A. “Rappresentanza e Corte costituzionale.” cit., (34?). 
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courts, France and the Unites States opt, on the contrary, for smaller courts. The first 
choice is justified by the research of independent and balanced decisions, completely 
free from political influences; the second one is, on the contrary, typical of a country 
which accepts ideological positions inside Courts. 
The third element which was analyzed was the expectation of Professional 
requirements in order to be appointed as a judge. In Italy, Germany and the United 
Kingdom the respective constitutions provide strict and high selective professional 
curricula. This is coherent which the aim to have the maximum professional 
standard. Moreover, it is evident that when professional requirements are specified, 
the degree of authorities’ political discretion will be lower (so will be higher the 
degree of judicial independence). Indeed,  authorities (often with political features) 
charged with judicial nominations could not select the candidates according to 
subjective or ideological criteria, but according to strictly established criteria (free of 
any political evaluation and often focused on merit). The situation is totally different 
in France, where no specific qualifications are required for appointments: not even a 
law degree.42 We saw that this datum contributes to consider the court as an 
appendix of the political power. Indeed authorities’ discretion in the appointments 
has two consequences: Court’s members have a professional experience mostly as 
public officials and they have a political past in the executive or in the legislative 
branch. The situation seems to present further special features in the US: indeed, 
throughout the consideration of demographic, sexual and, above all, ideological 
criteria in the US the scope is to find judges who correspond not only to high 
professional standards but, also, to high “representative” standards. In the US, on the 
basis of the awareness of Court’s intrinsic political power, the principal scope is not 
to have an independent Court but a Court which is able to represent the several 
spirits of American people. 
With regard to Judges’ tenure in office we noticed as, normally, States 
provide long and no renewable terms with the scope to prevent a strong degree of 
                                                 
42 Since the D'Estaign presidency, the trend has been to appoint candidates with legal experience, 
although Mitterrant relied on the traditional standard of personal loyalty. In Stone, A. The Birth of 
Judicial politics in France, the constitutional Council in comparative prospective, cit. 
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political homogeneity with the representative bodies. This is particularly true in the 
US  and UK where we have life tenure judges.  
The fifth (and, maybe, the most important) datum which has been analyzed, 
concerns the typology of authorities involved in judicial nominations. In this field, we 
can easily find how Judicial selection procedures are clearly a point where Justice and 
Politics intersect. Indeed, in the most of countries Constitutional judges are elected 
by political procedures: the question is what is the real degree of this politicization. 
Trying to measure this element, we placed in the following picture France and Italy 
respectively to the first and the last place: indeed French Judicial Selections 
procedure seems to be still too much influenced by politics, while the Italian ones are 
a sort of “manifest” of judicial independence (thank to the involvement of the 
Highest Judicial bodies in the appointment procedures). In the middle there are 
Germany and the United Kingdom where judges are respectively selected by more 
“democratic” or “impartial” methods (which see the participation of both the houses 
of the Parliament or of independent Judicial Appointment Commissions). However, 
we find in the middle also the United States where the strong politicization of judicial 
selection procedures is balanced by a high degree of transparency and cooperation. 
 
In the follow table we’ll sign in blue elements which could be reconnected to 
accountability and in red elements which could be reconnected to independence.  
 
Antonina Peri  
Judicial independence vs. judicial accountability Judicial selection models for…   23 
 Legal 
sources 
N. Professional 
requirements 
Tenure 
in office 
Authorities D&C  
opinion 
FRA Art. 56 Const.  9  /  9y, NR  3 Pres. Rep.  3 
Pres. Sen.  
3 Pres. Nat. Ass.  
No  
ITA Art. 135 
Const.  
15  1-High Judiciary.  
2- University Prof.  
3- attorneys 20 y 
(art. 135 c. 2)  
9 y NR  5 Pres. Rep  
5 Parl  
5 Magistr.  
No  
GER Artt. 93-100 
LF + sez. 3-10 
St. C  
16  -N.3 law judges 
(High federal court) 
-Juristen  
12y NR  Bundestrat  
Bundestag  
( 2/3)  
Yes  
USA  Art. II s. 2 
Const.  
9  crit. driven app.  
trasparency  
Life  Pres. US  
+Sen  
Yes  
UK  Part III, 
art.23ss 
CRA  
12  - High judicial off. 
2 y. 
- Legal practice 15 
y. 
Life (until 
70)  
JAC 
Lord Chancellor  
Yes  
 
In conclusion, from the following table we find the confirmation that France 
has the highest number of elements in favor of accountability and Italy the highest 
number of elements in favor of independence. We also underlined the datum of 
transparency which is proper of the US: this element is able to balance the 
politicization of judicial selection procedures (an element which France likes). 
 
 INDIPENDENCE ACCOUNTABILITY TRANSPARECY 
FRANCE 1  4  
ITALY 5   
GERMANY 4 1  
UNITED 
STATES 
1 3 1 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
4 1  
 
The last question which, naturally, arises from this paper is: is it possible to 
detect the “best” way to select Constitutional and Supreme Court Judges? Certainly, 
the growing role of these Judicial bodies poses more and more  problems with regard 
to their legitimacy: a judicial recruitment process which mixes up political 
accountability and transparency seems to be, in theory, the best solution to this 
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dilemma. However, we must consider that, in practice, does not exist “the best” 
selection system. We could ask ourselves: what is the best judicial selection method, a 
meritocratic one or a political one? Our opinion is that the answer is not one or the 
other: the answers can be both. Indeed, we think that the key to find out the right 
answer is considering, also, which form of government is involved, in brief which is 
the best selection system comprehending the role that the judiciary has in the balance 
of powers.  Consequently, looking to the actual debates concerning the reform of 
Justice in Italy, my opinion is that any attempt to influence or modify the degree of 
judicial independence or accountability through a legal reform (also, involving 
Judicial Selection procedures for the Constitutional Court), must confront itself with 
some of the most important pillars of the constitutional order: above all the rules 
governing the separation of powers and the form of Government.  
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Appendix 
Italian Constitutional Court’s composition (Tab. No. 1)43 
                                                 
43 March 2011 http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionCollegio.do. Ugo De Siervo left the Court in 
April 2011, Paolo Maddalena ended his office in July 2011. In September 2011 Marta Cartabia was 
appointed by the President of the Republic replacing the seat of Anna Maria Saulle (deceased).  
 Appointmen
t 
Education Professional 
experience 
Political or 
administrative 
experience 
Lattanzi 
(2010) 
Court of 
cassation 
Law Ordinary 
magistrate, long 
experience at the 
Court of cassation  
 
Finocchiaro 
(2002) 
“ “ Ord. Magistrate  
Criscuolo 
(2008) 
“ “ “ Judicial association 
(President), Higher 
Council of the 
Judiciary (1990-94) 
Maddalena 
(2002) 
Court of 
Accounts 
“ Accounting 
magistrate 
Ministerial cabinets 
Quaranta 
(2004) 
Council of 
State 
“ Administrative 
judge 
Ministerial cabinets 
Gallo 
(2004) 
President of 
the Republic 
“ University Fiscal 
Law 
Finance Minister 
(Ciampi) 
Cassese 
(2005) 
“ “ University 
Administrative 
Law 
Minister (Public 
Administration) 
(Ciampi) 
Saulle 
(2005) 
“ “ University 
International Law 
 
Tesauro 
(2005) 
“ “ University 
International Law 
Anti-trust 
Authority 
(President) 
Grossi 
(2009) 
“ “ University History 
of Italian Law 
 
De Siervo 
(2002) 
Parliament “ University 
Constitutional law 
Left, Privacy 
Authority 
(Member) 
Mazzella 
(2005) 
“ “ State Attorney Right, Minister 
(Public 
Administration) 
(Berlusconi), 
ministerial cabinets 
Silvestri 
(2005) 
“ “ University 
Constitutional 
Law 
Left, Higher 
Council of the 
Judiciary (1990-94) 
Napolitano 
(2006) 
“ “ Administrative 
judge 
Right, Ministerial 
cabinets 
Frigo 
(2008) 
“ “ Criminal Attorney Right, President of 
the Criminal Bar 
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German Federal Constitutional Court’s composition 44 (Tab. No. 2) 
 Appointment Education Professional 
experience 
Political or 
administrative 
experience 
Ferdinand 
Kirchhof 
NA; Fist Senate Dr. iur. 
(Heidelberg), Law 
University 
Professor, Judge  
 
Christine 
Hohmann-
Dennhardt 
“ Dr. jur., (Johann-
Wolfgang-Goethe 
University), Law 
University 
Professor and 
judge 
Head of the Department 
of Social Affairs of 
Frankfurt/Main; 
Minister of Justice of 
Hesse 
Brun-Otto 
Bryde 
“ Dr. jur., 
(Hamburg). Law 
Professor of 
Public Law 
 
Reinhard 
Gaier 
“ Dr. jur. (Dresden), 
Law 
 
Judge  
Michael 
Eichberger 
“ Dr. iur. (Mainz), 
Law 
Judge Minister Cabinet Baden-
Württemberg 
Wilhelm 
Schluckebier 
“ Law (Justus-
Liebig-Universität 
Gießen) 
Judge Federal Chancellery (Law 
and Administration 
Department) 
Johannes 
Masing 
“ Dr. jur. (Freiburg); 
law and 
philosophy 
Professor  
Andreas L. 
Paulus 
“ Dr. iur. 
(Munich);Law 
Professor  
Andreas 
Voßkuhle 
NA, Second 
Senate 
Dr. iur. (Ludwigs-
Maximilians-
Universität 
Munich), Law 
Professor Desk officer at the 
Bavarian State Ministry 
of the Interior 
Siegfried Broß “ Dr. iur. (Munich)  Professor Legal Department of the 
Bavarian State 
Chancellery 
Lerke Osterloh “ Dr. jur. Institute 
of Law of Public 
Finance, 
(Hamburg) 
Professor  
Udo Di Fabio “ Dr. jur. (Bonn), 
Law  
Judge and 
Professor 
Municipal adminstration 
official 
Rudolf 
Mellinghoff 
“ Studies at the 
University of 
Münster 
Judge  
Gertrude 
Lübbe-Wolff 
“ Dr. jur. (Freiburg) Professor  
Michael 
Gerhardt 
“ Dr. jur. Judge Bavarian Ministry of the 
Interior 
Herbert 
Landau 
“ Studied law  
(Justus-Liebig-
Universität in 
Gießen) 
Judge Federal Ministry of 
Justice 
 
                                                 
44 March 2011. http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/judges.html.  
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France Conseil Constitutionnel’s composition45 (Tab. No. 3) 
 Appointment Education Professional 
experience46 
Political or administrative 
experience 47 
Debré 
(2007) 
President of the 
Republic 
Political Science 
Paris, Law 
Ordinary 
magistrate 
Deputy, minister, speaker 
National Assembly 
Steinmetz 
(2004) 
President of the 
Republic 
PS Paris, ENA Prefect Ministerial cabinets 
Guillenchmidt 
(2004) 
President of the 
Senate 
PS Paris, Law Ordinary 
magistrate 
Ministerial cabinets 
Denoix de 
Saint Marc 
(2007) 
President of the 
Senate 
PS Paris, Law, 
ENA 
State councillor 
(Vice-Pr.) 
Ministerial cabinets 
Canivet 
(2007) 
President of the 
National 
Assembly 
Law, ENM Ordinary 
magistrate, Pres. 
Court of cassation 
 
Michel 
Charasse 
(2010) 
President of the 
Republic 
Law degree Politician Ministerial cabinet, member 
of the Senat 
Hubert Haenel 
(2010) 
President of the 
Senate 
Law, ENM Administrative 
magistrate, 
University 
professor 
Member of different 
government commissions 
Jacques Barrot 
(2010) 
President of the 
National 
Assembly 
Political Studies Politician in the 
national and 
European context 
Ministerial cabinet, member 
of the Parliament 
Claire Bazy-
Malaurie 
(2010) 
President of the 
National 
Assembly 
Political Studies Administrative 
functions 
Public Administration 
 
 
                                                 
45 March 2011. www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.  
46 In courts, at the bar, in universities… 
47 Ministerial cabinet and/or other top administrative appointments. 
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United States Supreme Court’s Composition48 (tab. No.4) 
 Appointment Education Professional 
experience49 
Political and 
administrative 
experience 
John G. Roberts 
(2005) 
George W. Bush  J.D. from 
Harvard Law 
School in 1979. 
Law clerk, judge to 
United States 
Court of Appeals 
for the District of 
Columbia 
U.S. Department of 
Justice, Associate 
Counsel to President 
Ronald Reagan, W 
Antonin Scalia 
(1986) 
Reagan  LL.B. from 
Harvard Law 
School 
Professor, Judge of 
the United States 
Court of Appeals 
for the District of 
Columbia Circuit 
 
Anthony M. 
Kennedy 
(1988) 
Reagan  LL.B. from 
Harvard Law 
School. 
Professor of 
Constitutional Law, 
judge appeal court 
 
Clarence Thomas 
(1991) 
Bush  
 
J.D. from Yale 
Law School 
Attorney, Judge of 
the United States 
Court of Appeals 
for the District of 
Columbia Circuit 
Chairman of the U.S. 
Equal Employment 
Opportunity 
Commission 
Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg 
(1993) 
Clinton 
 
LL.B. from 
Columbia Law 
School 
Professor of Law, 
Judge of the United 
States Court of 
Appeals for the 
District of 
Columbia Circuit 
 
Stephen G. Breyer 
(1994) 
Clinton  LL.B. from 
Harvard Law 
School 
Professor of Law, 
judge 
Member of the 
Judicial Conference 
of the United States 
Samuel Anthony 
Alito 
(2006) 
George W. Bush  
 
NA Judge, attorney  
Sonia Sotomayor 
(2009) 
Barack Obama  J.D. from Yale 
Law School 
Attorney, judge  
Elena Kagan 
(2010) 
Obama  J.D. from 
Harvard Law 
School 
Law Clerk, 
Professor 
Deputy assistant to 
the for Domestic 
Policy, Solicitor 
General of the 
United States 
                                                 
48 March 2011.  http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx.  
49 In courts, at the bar, in universities… 
Antonina Peri  
Judicial independence vs. judicial accountability Judicial selection models for…  29 
 
The UK Supreme Court’s composition50 (table No. 5) 
 Appointment Education Professional 
experience 
Political or 
administrative 
experience 
Lord Phillips Judicial 
Appointment 
Commission 
Law Judge  
Lord Hope “ Law, Cambridge, 
Edinburgh 
Member Scottish 
Bar, Judge 
 
Queens Counsel 
Lord Saville 
de 
Newdigate 
“ Law, Oxford Judge Chair Committee 
of the Department 
of Trade and 
Industry 
Lord Rodger “ Law, Glasgow, 
Oxford 
University, Judge, 
Solicitor General 
 
Lord Walker “ Cambridge Bar; judge  
Lady Hale “ Cambridge Bar; University; 
judge 
Law Commission 
Lord Brown “ Law, Oxford Bar; judge Chairman of Sub-
Committee E 
(Law and 
Institutions) of the 
House of Lords 
European Union 
Select Committee 
from 2005 to 
2007. 
Lord Mance “ Law, Oxford Bar; Judge  
Lord Collins “ Law, Cambridge, 
Columbia (USA) 
Solicitor; Judge  
Lord Kerr “ Law, Queen’s 
University, 
Belfast 
Bar; Crown 
Counsel; Judge 
 
Lord Clarke “ Law, Maritime 
and Commercial 
Bar; judge (Master 
of the Rolls) 
 
John Dyson “ Law Bar, judge to the 
High Court 
 
 
                                                 
50 March 2011 http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/biographies.html.  
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